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Tobacco Explained

5. Cigarette design: additives, low-tar and 'safe' cigarettes

    Should we market cigarettes intended to re-assure the smoker that they are safer without assuring ourselves that indeed they are so or are not less safe? […] Are smokers entitled to expect that cigarettes shown as lower delivery in league tables will in fact deliver less to their lungs than cigarettes shown higher?"

    BAT in 1977 expressing worries about marketing low-tar cigarettes, which the industry knew offered false health reassurance without real health benefits. 1

     

5.1 Summary

    By the late fifties, through the sixties and seventies, the industry scientists were grappling with trying to find a "safe cigarette". The challenge was to reduce tar levels for health reasons, whilst maintaining similar or raised nicotine levels to keep customers hooked. Scientists struggled with the problem that, although they should reduce nicotine on health grounds, too little nicotine would help people wean themselves off cigarettes. By the late seventies, scientists were concerned that nicotine would have to be reduced so low that most smokers would stop smoking tobacco… but that threat never materialised.

    By the mid-sixties, concern over the health effects of tobacco was so great that the tobacco companies begin looking at alternative nicotine delivery systems. Industry consultants and scientists warned that because of carcinogens produced by the burning of tobacco, it would never be possible to find a completely "safe" cigarette. By the seventies, the scientists believed that they could still partially solve the problem and that a "safe" cigarette was still the key to the industry’s future.

    Also beginning in the mid-sixties, Philip Morris begins using ammonia in its cigarette production. Ammonia transforms nicotine from a bound state to a free one, where it can be more rapidly absorbed by the smoker. Ammonia technology is now widely used through the industry.

    By the late sixties companies were consciously defining "health orientated" cigarettes which had reduced biological activity compared to those termed "health reassurance", which were marketed to reassure the customer about their health claims but actually offered no significant health benefit.

    By the early seventies companies were discussing ‘compensation’, whereby a smoker adjusts their smoking pattern in order to get a specific level of nicotine – therefore a smoker using a low tar product "compensates" for the low nicotine delivery by smoking more, an effect not replicated in the official machine measurements. By the end of the decade, industry researchers were even postulating that "the effect of switching to a low tar cigarette may be to increase, not decrease, the risks of smoking".

    By the mid-seventies, scientists at the US company Liggett had developed a cigarette with a significantly reduced health hazard – however the research was taken over by the lawyers and the product was never marketed.

    By the early eighties, other company researchers were told they could never market a "safe cigarette" because that would imply that other cigarettes were dangerous.

    In the eighties and early nineties, B&W even started examining growing genetically engineered tobacco designed to double the nicotine in the plant.

    In the nineties tobacco companies have repeatedly denied manipulating the levels of nicotine in cigarettes.

     

5.2 What is known - key facts on low tar and safe cigarettes

 

5.3 What the tobacco industry said and what it knew

5.3.1 Mid-Late 1950s: scientists recognise the problem

In the beginning the scientists and the lawyers were optimistic

 A scientist at Liggett remarks:

"if we can eliminate or reduce the carcinogenic agent in smoke we will have made real progress." 4 (Liggett, 1954)

A Hill and Knowlton memo quotes a tobacco company lawyer as saying

"Boy! Wouldn't it be wonderful if our company was first to produce a cancer-free cigarette. What we could do to the competition."  5

 

Whoever is first to reduce tar will take the market

 A Philip Morris scientist acknowledges the health problem:

"Evidence is building up that heavy smoking contributes to lung cancer."

He then recommends an…

"all-synthetic aerosol to replace tobacco smoke, if necessary … I know this sounds like a wild programme, but I’ll bet that the first company to produce a cigarette claiming a substantial reduction in tars and nicotine … will take the market." 6(Philip Morris,1958)

 

But there is a big problem if nicotine is reduced

 Even at this early stage, the underlying imperative of nicotine is understood and factored into product design thinking. A BAT scientist writes:

"Reducing the nicotine per cigarette might end in destroying the nicotine habit in a large number of consumers and prevent it ever being acquired by new smokers." 7(BAT, 1959)

 

5.3.2 Early-Mid 1960s: the search for the safe cigarette

Scientists discuss reducing carcinogens in smoke

 Senior Philip Morris scientists look into the possibility of a

"‘Medically Acceptable Cigarette’, which will take seven to ten years because it will require a major research effort, because carcinogens are found in practically every class of compounds in smoke." 8 (Philip Morris, 1961)

 

And manipulating levels of nicotine

 It is clear that the companies regarded the product as a drug delivery device, which could deliver nicotine according to a design. The nicotine level of B&W cigarettes

"…was not obtained by accident …we can regulate, fairly precisely, the nicotine and sugar levels to almost any desired level management might require." 9(BAT, 1963)

 

PR strategy and safe cigarette strategy in conflict

 The PR problem with safer cigarettes is that they are an admission that what came before was more dangerous - something that was denied:

"When the health question was first raised we had to start by denying it at the PR level. But by continuing that policy we had got ourselves into a corner and left no room to manoeuvre. In other words if we did get a breakthrough and were able to improve our product we should have to about-face, and this was practically impossible at the PR level." 10(BAT, 1962)

 

Begin looking at other products for nicotine delivery

BAT begins the search for a new form of nicotine delivery - Project Ariel - which uses a water-based nicotine aerosol:

"The main objective of Ariel is to achieve the physiological response of normal cigarettes, and it was suggested that the line of attack [should be] a close comparison of the chemical state of nicotine in the tobacco extract and the smoke." 11 (BAT, 1964)

5.3.3 Mid to late 1960s:

Maximum nicotine minimum tar

 Head of R&D at B&W tours UK research laboratories:

"Their approach seems to be to find ways of obtaining maximum nicotine for minimum tar." 12 (BAT, 1965)

 

Ammonia used to increase nicotine ‘hit’

 By increasing the alkalinity, ammonia makes more of the nicotine ‘free’ and therefore increases the effect of a given quantity of nicotine in the cigarette. According to RJ Reynolds, Philip Morris begins using ammoniated sheets this year and concludes:

"increased use of the sheet periodically from 1965 to 1974. This time period corresponds to the dramatic sales increase Philip Morris made from 1965 to 1974" 13. (RJR, undated)

 

BAT notes the importance of pH

 A report by BAT’s Research Department found that

"nicotine retention appears to be dependent principally on smoke pH and nicotine content" 14.

 

We have a problem – there will never be a safe smoke

 Consultants to BAT conclude that a completely safe cigarette is unlikely:

"Because known carcinogens are produced from such a wide variety of organic materials during the process of pyrolysis, it is most unlikely that a completely safe form of tobacco smoking can be evolved." 15 (F Roe, M Pike, 1965 or 1966)

 

‘Low tar’ cigarettes may give low readings on machine, but high doses to smokers

 The Canadian Tobacco Industry accepts low tar readings on machines:

"human smokers differ greatly in the frequency and intensity of their puffing and the amount of each cigarette they smoke. Thus there may be little relation between the figures reported from the machine and the actual exposure of any given smoker with any given cigarette" 16. (1969)

 

Health reassurance versus health benefits

 D R Green from BAT expounds what will become a key distinction - cigarettes that appear less harmful versus cigarettes that are less harmful:

"Although there may, on occasions, be conflict between saleability and minimal biological activity, two types of product should clearly be distinguished, viz: A health-image (health reassurance) cigarette. A health-orientated (minimal biological activity) cigarette, to be kept on the market for those customers choosing it." 17(S.Green 1968)

 

5.3.4 Early – Mid 1970s:

Safe smoking is still the future

 "The ‘safer’ cigarette is in my view the key to the industry’s future." 18   (BAT 1971)

 

Make nicotine more effective

 Liggett researches adjusting pH levels with the

"eventual goal of lowering the total amount of nicotine while increasing the effect of the nicotine." 19(Liggett, 1972)

 

We can reduce tar and ‘reassure’ customers cigarettes are healthy

 "Manufacturers are concentrating on the low TPM [total particulate matter] tar and Nicotine segment in order to create brands ...which aim, in one way or another, to reassure the consumer that theses brands are relatively more "healthy" than orthodox blended cigarettes." 20 (BAT 1971)

 

Let the Government make the health claim

 A BAT document on "Smoking and Health", says that

"the industry should however never put itself in the position that by offering to publish tar/nicotine figures it is implying that some cigarettes are ‘safer’. If there is to be any suggestion of this, it must come from the government." 21(BAT, 1970)

 

‘Marketable’ cigarettes versus ‘safer’ cigarettes

 "This is what our management really expects R&D to do. Things like marketable low tar and nicotine cigarettes …The question as to whether such cigarettes are really safer does not matter … even our Health people wonder whether low tar and nicotine cigarettes are a good idea. I think the researches going on into the smoker’s response to such modified cigarettes comprise genuine inquiry in the smoking and health field, examining what I call the ‘involuntary moderation’ concept of a safer cigarette." 22 (BAT 1971)

 

5.3.5 Mid to late 1970s:

‘Light’ does not actually mean less

 "Marlboro Lights cigarettes were not smoked like regular Marlboros. In effect, the Marlboro 85 smokers in this study did not achieve any reduction in smoke intake by smoking a cigarette (Marlboro Lights)." 23 (Philip Morris 1975)

 

And lower nicotine levels might wean smokers off the habit

 "There is a danger in the current trend of lower and lower cigarette deliveries - i.e. the smoker will be weaned away from the habit. If the nicotine delivery is reduced below a threshold ‘satisfactory’ level, then surely smokers will question more readily why they are indulging in an expensive habit." 24 (BAT 1977)

 

So we will just manipulate the pH

 "As the pH increases, the nicotine changes its chemical form so that it is more rapidly absorbed by the body and more quickly gives a ‘kick’ to the smoker." 25(J McKenzie 1976)

 

And just carry on reassuring the customer

 A marketing paper for BAT states:

"All work in this area should be directed towards providing consumer reassurance about cigarettes and the smoking habit. This can be provided in different ways, e.g. by claiming low deliveries, by the perception of low deliveries and by the perception of ‘mildness’." 26(P Short 1977)

 

However filters are just a con

 B&W’s lawyer:

"In most cases, however, the smoker of a filter cigarette was getting as much or more nicotine and tar as he would have gotten from a regular cigarette. He had abandoned the regular cigarette, however, on the grounds of reduced risk to health." 27 (E Pepples 1976)

 

And we are conning people about low tar

 One tobacco scientist concludes

"the effect of switching to low tar cigarette may be to increase, not decrease, the risks of smoking." 28(P Lee for BAT, 1979)

 

And is it really ethical anyway

 A scientist at Liggett asks:

"Is it morally permissible to develop a safe method for administering a habit-forming drug when, in so doing, the number of addicts will increase?" 29 (Liggett, 1978)

 

5.3.6 Early to Mid 1980s:

Independent evidence

 A study in the American Journal of Public Health finds that if smokers block the holes of low-tar cigarettes, this could increase toxic by-products of smoke by up to 300 per cent. 30 This illustrates smokers’ pronounced control over nicotine administration and their ability to achieve high doses from ‘low’ cigarettes. (American Journal of Public Health, 1980)

 

Lawyer say can’t have a safe cigarette

 A scientists employed by Philip Morris on the safer cigarette programme, recalls that:

"They lawyers said we couldn’t say it - we couldn’t make a ‘safe cigarette’ because that implies that the cigarettes the manufacturers make aren’t safe, and that would make the company liable so the programme was shelved." 31 (Cited Dispatches, Channel 4 1996)

 

Surgeon General recognises the task is impossible

 The Surgeon General concludes that there is

"no such thing as a safe cigarette." 32 (J Richmond 1981)

 

Need to make low tar cigarettes more attractive

 "B&W will undertake activities designed to generate statements by public health opinion leaders which will indicate tolerance for smoking and improve the consumer’s perception of ultra low ‘tar’ cigarettes (5 mg or less). The first step will be the identification of attractive scientists not previously involved in the low delivery controversy who would produce studies re-emphasizing the lower delivery, less risk concept." 33 (B&W 1982)

 

Need to counter-act claims that low tar cigarettes are bogus

 "Compensatory smoking - This is also a particularly tricky subject. On the one hand it is commercially sensitive. On the other, it must be in the interest of the industry to get data and speak out against those who claim that the low delivery programme is misleading in that smokers compensate for the low deliveries." 34 (BAT, 1983)

 

And carry on smoke manipulation

 "we can disturb the status quo either directly or indirectly … addition of nicotine/salts/derivatives to the blend, increase/decrease nicotine availability through pH manipulation." 35 (BAT 1984)

5.3.7 Mid-Late 1980s:

‘Safe cigarettes’ killed off at BAT

 Patrick Sheehy, the head of BAT, objects to a proposal for a safe cigarette:

"I cannot support your contention that we should give a higher priority to projects aimed at developing a ‘safe’ cigarette (as perceived by those who claim our current product is ‘unsafe’) either by eliminating, or at least reducing to an acceptable levels, all components claimed by our critics to be carcinogenic."

[…]

"In attempting to develop a ‘safe’ cigarette you are, by implication in danger of being interpreted as accepting that the current product is ‘unsafe’ and this is not a position that I think we should take." 36 (BAT, 1986)

 

Stop quitters quitting

 "Quitters may be discouraged from quitting, or at least kept in the market longer, by either of two product opportunities noted before. A less irritating cigarette is one route (Indeed, the practice of switching to lower tar cigarettes and sometimes menthol in the quitting process tacitly recognises this). The safe cigarette would have wide appeal, limited mainly by the social pressures to quit." 37 (Creative Research Group, 1986)

5.3.8 1990s:

Low tar advertising is misleading

 "It has been argued for several years that low tar and ultra-low tar cigarettes are not really what they are claimed to be … the argument can be constructed that ULT advertising is misleading to the smoker ..Smokers of low yield cigarette adjust their smoking manoeuvre to obtain some desired level of nicotine and therefore concomitantly increase their tar intake." 38 (RJR, c. 1990-91)

 

Carry on controlling nicotine

 RJ Reynold’s stated goal is to

"develop a viable process for the total control of nicotine in product." The ‘Basis’ behind this is "It is in the best long term interest for RJR to be able to control and effectively utilise every pound of nicotine we purchase." 39 (RJR 1991)

 

FDA: Evidence companies control nicotine

 US FDA Commissioner, David Kessler says that there is

"mounting evidence"

that tobacco companies control levels of nicotine. 40 (P Pringle 1998)

 

BAT claims it does not manipulate nicotine

 The fact that the tobacco companies are manipulating nicotine brings the greatest threat of all - that regulatory agencies such as the FDA will start to treat the product like a drug and regulate every aspect of its production and marketing.

BAT denies doctoring cigarettes, stating that

"There is no way we add anything to enhance the nicotine." 41 (BAT 1995)

The CEO of RJ Reynolds:

"We do not increase the level of nicotine in any of our products to ‘addict’ smokers." 42 (RJR, 1998)

 

BAT admits its "Light" products may not be any safer

 The tactic adopted to market ‘low-tar’ cigarettes was and remains to avoid explicit health claims, and to rely on the implicit health claims created by the mandatory machine-measured tar and nicotine yields - even though these are thoroughly misleading as measurements of health impact.

"We have been taking note of public health concerns by developing "lighter" products, but "we cannot promote these products as ‘safer’ cigarettes because we simply don’t have sufficient understanding of all the chemical processes to do so." 43 (BAT,1997)

 

 

References:

  1. PL Short, BAT Co. Smoking and Health Item 7: the Effect on Marketing. 14th April 1977. Minnesota Trial Exhibit 10,585.
  2. Russell MAH, Jarvis M, Iyer R, Feyerabend C. Relation of nicotine yield of cigarettes to blood nicotine concentrations in smokers. British Medical Journal 1980;280(6219):972-976.
  3. Benowitz NL, Hall SM, Herning RI, et a. Smokers of low-yield cigarettes do not consume less nicotine. New England Journal of Medicine 1983;309(3):139-142.
  4. F. Darkis, minutes of a meeting of Liggett scientists, March 29, 1954.cited in R. Kluger, Ashes to Ashes New York, 1996, p165
  5. Star Tribune, Tobacco on Trial: Week in Review, 1998, 22 February
  6. P. J. Hilts, Smokescreen - The Truth Behind the Tobacco Industry Cover-Up, 1996, Addison Wesley, p26 quoting CV Mace, Memo to R N DuPuis, Untitled, 1958, 24 July
  7. BAT Research & Development, Complexity of the P.A.5.A. Machine and Variables Pool, 1959, 26 August [Minn 10,392]
  8. H. Wakeham, Tobacco and Health – R&D Approach, 1961, 15 November {Cipollone 608; Minn. Trial Exhibit 10,300}
  9. Quoted in Report of Special Master: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendations Regarding Non-Liggett Privilege Claims, Minnesota Trial Court File Number C1-94-8565, 1998, 8 March, {Minn. Plaintiff’s Exhibit 56 (1) BATCo 1026303333, p336}; .B. Griffith, Letter to John Kirwan, B.A.T, 1963
  10. A. McCormick, Smoking and Health: Policy on Research, Minutes of Southampton Meeting, 1962 {1102.01}
  11. C. Ellis, BAT R&D, Note of a meeting to discuss ARIEL. 11 February 1964.
  12. R. Griffith, Report to the Executive Committee [of a site visit to TRC Harrogate Research Laboratories], 1965 {1105.01}
  13. RJ Reynolds, Ammonisation, Undated, {Minn. Trial Exhibit 13,141}
  14. BAT R&D Establishment, The Retention of Nicotine and Phenols in the Human Mouth, 1968, {BW-W2-11691}
  15. F. J. C. Roe, M.C. Pike, Smoking and Lung Cancer, Undated, {Minn. Trial Exhibit 11,041}
  16. Ad Hoc Committee of the Canadian Tobacco Industry, A Canadian Tobacco Industry Presentation on Smoking and Health, A Presentation to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Health, Welfare and Social Affairs,1969, 5 June, p1579-1689 Quoted in R. Cunningham, Smoke and Mirrors 1996, p162
  17. S. Green, Research Conference Held at Hilton Head Island, S.C. Minutes, 1968, 24 September{1112.02}
  18. BAT, Smoking and Health Session, Chelworth, 1971, 28 May [L&D UK Ind 24]
  19. Liggett, 1972 [Minn.Att.Gen]
  20. PL Short, BAT Co. A New Product. 1971, 21 October, {Minn Trial Exhibit 10,306}
  21. G.C. Hargrove, Smoking and Health, 1970, 12 June [L&D BAT 9]
  22. R. M. Gibb, Memo to Dr. S. Green, 1995, 13 February [L&D RJR /BAT 23]
  23. L.F. Meyer, Inter-office memorandum to B. Goodman. Philip Morris USA, 1975, 17 September [Minn trial exhibit 11,564]
  24. BAT Co. The Product in the Early 1980s, 1977, 25 March { Minn 11,386]}
  25. J. L. McKenzie, Product Characterization Definitions and Implications, 1976, 21 September {Minn. Trial Exhibit 12,270}
  26. PL Short, Smoking and Health Item 7: the Effect on Marketing, 1977, 14 April { Minn Trial Exhibit 10,585}
  27. E. Pepples, Industry Response to the Cigarette/Health Controversy, 1976, Internal Memo {2205.01}
  28. P.N.Lee, Note on Tar Reduction For Hunter, Tobacco Advisory Council, 1979, 19 July [L&D UK Ind 33]
  29. Dr. D. M. Conning, The Concept of Less Hazardous Cigarettes, 1978, 15 May {Minn. Trial Exhibit 11,792}
  30. Kozlowski et al. American Journal of Public Health, November 1980. Quoted in R. Kluger, Ashes to Ashes, New York, 1996, p433
  31. Quoted on Channel 4, Big Tobacco, Dispatches, 1996, 31 October
  32. J. B. Richmond, Statement, Surgeon-General, 1981, 12 January; Surgeon-General, The Health Consequences of Smoking: The Changing Cigarette, A Report of the Surgeon-General, 1981, US Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, p8
  33. B&W, What are the Obstacles/ Enemies of a Swing to Low ‘Tar’ and What Action Should we Take?, 1982, 2 July {Minn. Trial Exhibit 26,185}
  34. L. Blackman, Notes of a Meeting of Tobacco Company Research Directors, Imperial Head Office, 1983, 16 February {Minn. Trial Exhibit 11,259}
  35. BAT, Nicotine Conference, 1984, 6-8 June {Minn trial exhibit 18,998}
  36. P. Sheehy, Confidential Internal Memo, 1986, 18 December {Minn. Trial Exhibit. 11,296}
  37. Creative Research group, Project Viking, Volume 11: Am Attitudinal Model of Smoking, 1986, February- March, prepared for Imperial Tobacco Limited (Canada)
  38. RJ Reynolds, The Over-smoking Issue (Tar to Nicotine Ratio), Undated - latest data used is November 1990, {Minn. Trial Exhibit 13,139}
  39. RJ Reynolds, Rest Programme Review, 1991, 3 May {Minn. Trial Exhibit 13,165}
  40. P. Pringle, Dirty Business – Big Tobacco at the Bar of Justice, Aurum Press, 1998, p33
  41. The Guardian, Cigarette Tampering Denied, 1995, 19 October, p23
  42. Quoted in Report of Special Master: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendations Regarding Non-Liggett Privilege Claims, Minnesota Trial Court File Number C1-94-8565, 1998, 8 March {Minn Plaintiff’s Exhibit 33 (1) RJR 513193867, p 867}
  43. T. Tuinstra, Speaking Up, Tobacco Reporter, 1997, December, p30-32

 

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